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BANISHMENT AS CULTURAL JUSTICE IN
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LEGAL SYSTEMS:
A POSTSCRIPT ON QUAIR V. SISCO
PATRICE H. KUNESH*
In Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal Legal Systems
(Banishmentas CulturalJustice),' I examined the historical and contemporary use
of banishment in American Indian societies, as well as recent challenges to such
tribal decisions in federal courts under the habeas corpus provision of the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA).2 These disputes pit traditional tribal customs and practices,
which have weathered the test of time and have ensured the political and cultural
survival of tribes, against the rights of individual tribal members to fairness in their
dealings with a tribe-rights in the modem era of Indian law defined in terms of
constitutional-like due process protections under the ICRA. Federal courts are
arbiters of such internal conflicts, wrestling with the contours of federal jurisdiction
to review tribal decisions and decision-making processes, and to define an individual
tribal member's due process rights under ICRA's habeas corpus provision.3
In a series of cases, beginning with Quair v. Sisco (QuairI),4 which is examined
in detail in Banishment as Cultural Justice,' and the recent decision in Quair v.
Sisco (QuairI1),6 the Federal District Court of the Eastern District of California
assessed itsjurisdiction to review tribal banishment and disenrollment decisions and,
in Quair II, adopted an analysis that mirrors the construct proposed in Banishment
as Cultural Justice.7 The dispute in Quair began in October 2000, when two

members of the Santa Rosa Rancheria Tachi Indian Tribe (the Tribe) were banished
and disenrolled by the Tribe's General Council for hiring an attorney to pursue legal
action against the Tribe, actions deemed to have directly threatened the stability and
welfare of the tribal community.8 In QuairI, the district court's authority to review
the General Council's banishment and disenrollment decisions rested on the court's
finding that banishment, a criminal proceeding, constituted a detention, and that the
tribal member petitioners had exhausted available tribal remedies. 9 The court
questioned the Tribe's hearing procedures, including whether the General Council

* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of South Dakota School of Law.
1. Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment as CulturalJustice in ContemporaryTribal Legal Systems, 37 N.M. L.

REv. 85 (2007).
2. Through Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Congress sought to impose on tribal governments
most of the constitutional rights established in the Bill of Rights. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2000). The habeas
corpus provision of the ICRA tests the legality of an individual's detention by order of an Indian tribe. Id. § 1303.
For a detailed discussion of the ICRA, see Kunesh, supra note 1, Part lI.B.2.
3. See Kunesh, supra note 1, Part ll.B.2-4.
4. 359 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
5. See Kunesh, supra note 1, Part V.C.
6. No. 1:02-CV-5891 DFL, 2007 WL 1490571 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2007).
7. Id.; see also Kunesh, supra note 1, Parts IV.B, C (cautioning against federal court intervention in tribal
membership matters, and proposing a balancing test that preserves tribal cultural and governmental identities).
8. Quair 1, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 962; Quair II, 2007 WL 1490571, at *1. For more information on the
background of this dispute, see Kunesh, supra note I, at 128-31. The General Council is comprised of all adult
members of the Tribe who act collectively on behalf of the tribal community. Quair 1, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 954; Quair
I, 2007 WL 1490571, at *I n.l.
9. Quair1, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 971-72; QuairII, 2007 WL 1490571, at *1.
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provided the petitioners proper notice of the charges and an opportunity for a fair
trial.' 0
Following this decision, the General Council convened a new hearing, this time
sending the petitioners written notice of the hearing and advising them of their right
to legal representation and to call witnesses.' The petitioners refused to attend the
rehearing, maintaining that they would not receive a fair and impartial review before
the same body that made the initial determinations. 2 Nonetheless, the General
Council met on October 1, 2004 and, in separately presented resolutions, reaffirmed
its earlier decisions to disenroll and banish the petitioners. 3 The petitioners then
challenged these decisions under the ICRA, contending that the Tribe had yet again
violated their due process rights in the rehearing process."
In Quair II, the district court considered the General Council's disenrollment
decisions independent from its banishment decisions, evaluating each action under
the habeas corpus test set out in QuairJ.15 The court ultimately concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction over the petitioners' disenrollment claims because the petitioners
failed to prove that their physical freedoms were constrained severely enough to
constitute a detention.' The court nevertheless retained jurisdiction to review the
Tribe's banishment7 decisions subject to balancing the Tribe's interest against those
of the petitioners.1
This Postscript presents a brief review of the jurisprudence that formed the basis
for the Quair II decision and then analyzes the Quair HI decision, discussing the
implications of the district court's holding and focusing on the ramifications of the
new elements of habeas corpus review under the ICRA. This Postscript concludes
that the comity model, as proposed in Banishment as Cultural Justice, and as
mirrored in QuairII, is the appropriate framework for the review and resolution of
tribal disputes arising from banishment decisions because the comity model follows
tribal notions of respect for fairness and individual dignity.
The following section presents a brief review of the jurisprudence underpinning
the district court's recent decision in QuairI and analyzes the court's new approach
to evaluating tribal decisions under the ICRA. Beginning in 1996, with the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca
Indians,'8 federal courts have cobbled together a test to determine the reviewability
of tribal banishment actions. In Poodry, the traditional Council of Chiefs of the
Tonawanda Band'of Seneca Indians banished several tribal members from the

10. Quairl,359 F. Supp. 2d at 978; QuairII, 2007 WL 1490571, at *1 n.3.
11. QuairH,2007 WL 1490571, at *l.
12. Id.
13. Id. at * 1-2. Unlike the 2000 hearing, where the General Council vote encompassed both disenrollment
and banishment, these issues were separately presented to and voted on by the General Council in the 2004
rehearing. See id. at *2. With some circumspection, Judge Levi noted, in the recent district court decision, that the
General Council's rehearing "did not follow any codified adjudicatory procedures. Moreover, the 'customary' law
that petitioners purportedly violated-the law against disturbing the stability and welfare of the Tribe-had not been
reduced to writing in any code, statute book or similar document." Id.
14. Id. at *1.
15. Id. at *2.
16. Id. at *3-4.
17. Id. at *4-6.
18. 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Kunesh, supra note 1, Part IV.A.
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reservation and instructed that their names be removed from the Tribe's membership
rolls for actions that the Council considered treasonous.' 9 The tribal members
petitioned for habeas corpus review under the ICRA, claiming that the Council
violated their due process rights by failing to give them any notice of the charges
against them or an opportunity to participate in the Council's deliberations.2" The
Second Circuit held that permanent banishment, a severe form of punishment,
constituted a sufficient restraint on the tribal members' liberty interests to qualify
as a detention and permit federal review under the ICRA.2'
The same approach was argued unsuccessfully in a set of cases involving the
Oneida Tribe in New York. In Shenandoah v. United States Departmentof Interior
(Shenandoah J),21 several tribal members filed habeas petitions under the ICRA
alleging due process violations in tribal actions that terminated their health care and
other tribal benefits, banned their presence from various locations on the reservation,
and struck their names from the tribal membership rolls. 23 The Second Circuit
dismissed the tribal members' petitions finding that these sanctions were insufficient
to constitute an actual or threatened restraint on their liberty interests under the
Poodry test. 24 The Second Circuit also dismissed petitioners' second habeas action,
which challenged the Tribe's housing ordinance as an illegal seizure without
compensation and as an illegal bill of attainder,25 characterizing the loss of their
homes under the operation of the tribal law as an economic restraint, not an
impingement of their liberty interests required to trigger habeas review under
Poodry.26

A few years later in Quair 1,27 a federal district court found the requisite
jurisdiction under Poodry to review a sequence of tribal banishment and
disenrollment decisions. The court initially accepted the Poodry court's view that
banishment is criminal in nature, thus constituting a detention for purposes of ICRA
jurisdiction. 2' To this finding, the court then added another component-the
requirement of exhaustion of tribal remedies.29
Following the decision in QuairI, the Tribe's General Council reconsidered its
earlier decisions and agreed to provide the petitioners with a rehearing, this time
giving them notice of the rehearing by certified mail and advising them of their right

19. Poodry, 85 F.3d at 877-78; see also Kunesh, supra note 1, Part W.A.
20. Poodry, 85 F.3d at 879.
21. Id. at 895-97.
22. 159 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1998). For a discussion of Shenandoah v. United States Departmentof Interior
(Shenandoah1) and Shenandoah v. Halbritter(Shenandoah11), 366 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2004), see Kunesh, supranote
1, Part IV.B.
23. Shenandoah I, 159 F.3d at 714.
24. Id.
25. Shenandoah11, 366 F.3d at 91.
26. Id. at 92 ("[F]ederal habeas jurisdiction does not operate to remedy economic restraints.").
27. 359 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Cal. 2004); see Kunesh, supra note 1, Part V.C.
28. Quair 1, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 967. "[T]he district court concluded that the combined imposition of
banishment and disenrollment 'constitute[d] a punitive sanction irregardless [sic] of the underlying circumstances
leading to those decisions' that 'render[ed] those proceedings criminal for purposes of habeas corpus relief,' despite
the absence of any underlying criminal proceedings in the case." Kunesh, supra note 1, at 131 (second, third, and
fourth alteration in original) (quoting Quair1, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 967).
29. Quair1, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 963.
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to have legal counsel represent them and to present and confront witnesses.3" Unlike
the 2000 hearing, the General Council's votes at the 2004 rehearing to banish and
disenroll petitioners were later approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs as required
under the Tribe's Articles of Community Organization.3
Tactically, the General Council's decision to separately consider and vote on the
petitioners' banishment and disenrollment proved to be a key factor in the federal
district court's review of the petitioners' claims. In Quair I, the General Council's
2000 combined vote compelled the court to hold, following Poodry, that
"disenrollment from tribal membership and subsequent banishment from the
reservation constitutes detention. ' '32 Uncoupling the issues and separating the votes
in Quair H allowed the district court to view the General Council's 2004
disenrollment and banishment decisions as two distinct tribal sanctions,33 and

allowed the Tribe to maintain that the court lacked jurisdiction over disenrollment
decisions, which, like membership decisions, have traditionally been withdrawn
from federal review under the ICRA. 34 The court did not wholly reject this
argument, finding instead that tribal membership decisions are subject to review
under 25 U.S.C. § 1303 if all three prongs of the QuairI test are satisfied: "(1) the
proceeding at issue is criminal and not civil in nature; (2) the Tribe is detaining [the
petitioners]; and (3) [the petitioners] have exhausted all available tribal remedies. 3 5
The court then added a new
substantive dimension to the detention component' ' 36
"geographical movement.

Significantly, in order to establish that the tribal action affects a detention for
purposes of habeas corpus review, the petitioners had to prove that their
"disenrollment, separate from banishment, restrict[ed] their physical freedom in any

30. Quair v. Sisco (QuairI1), No. 1:02-CV-5891 DFL, 2007 WL 1490571, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2007).
31. Id. at *2. In Banishment as CulturalJustice, I questioned the validity of the General Council's votes due
to the absence of Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) approval since the General Council's authority to "control.. .loss
of membership" requires the enactment of an ordinance or resolution subsequently approved by the BIA. Kunesh,
supra note 1, at 133-34 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In QuairH1,although the BIA
approved the General Council's disenrollment and banishment resolutions, the question remains whether an
enrollment ordinance, and concomitantly a disenrollment ordinance-a prerequisite to General Council action-was
properly enacted and approved, as required under the Articles of Community Organization, thus ensuring the
legitimacy of the Council's actions and petitioners' ability to completely exhaust tribal remedies.
32. QuairI, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 971; see also Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874,
901 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the tribe's banishment decision, combined with disenrollment, was subject to
federal habeas review).
33. Quair 11, 2007 WL 1490571, at *2-6. Judge Levi further noted that the court's ruling in QuairI "does
not govern the disenrollment of petitioners at the 2004 rehearing....Because the disenrollment and banishment of
petitioners were inseparable before the rehearing, [the court] had no reason to consider whether the court had habeas
corpus jurisdiction to review disenroUment separate from banishment." Id. at *2 n.6.
34. Id. at *2 ("'[T]he [federal] judiciary should not rush in to create causes of action that would intrude on
these delicate matters."' (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978) (second alteration
in original)); see also Kunesh, supra note 1, at 133 (noting "the doubtfulness of the court's jurisdiction over
enrollment matters").
35. Quairl1,2007 WL 1490571, at *2 (citing Quair1,359 F. Supp. 2d at 963 and Poodry, 85 F.3d at901).
The Quair decisions establish a precarious principle that tribal banishment decisions, in and of themselves,
constitute criminal proceedings for purposes of satisfying the detention prong of the Poodry jurisdictional test,
regardless of the nature of the action underlying the banishment. See Kunesh, supra note 1, at 121-22, 132 n.360
(discussing language in the Santa Clara decision and in the ICRA's legislative history concerning federal habeas
review for criminal proceedings).
36. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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way. '37 Applying this new "geographic movement" component, 38 the court found
that the petitioners' disenrollment affected only their interests in "tangible tribal
benefits," such as distribution of gaming revenue;39 yet as "nonmembers," they
arguably could still live on the reservation.4 ° Under this elaboration, a tribal
disenrollment decision that does not substantially constrain a person's physical
mobility within the geographic boundaries of the tribal community will not
constitute a detention or warrant habeas corpus review under the ICRA.41
Unavailing, however, were the Tribe's arguments that the additional procedures
provided in the General Council's 2004 rehearing cured the due process deficiencies
in the Tribe's 2000 hearing. In Quair I, the court refused to dismiss the case on
summaryjudgment because it found several disputed material facts, such as whether
the petitioners received any notice of the charges against them or notice of the
General Council's hearing to consider their banishment and disenrollment, as well
as the petitioners' right to call and question witnesses at the hearing.42 The Tribe
urged the QuairII court to find that its subsequent remedial actions, particularly the
rehearing, notice to the petitioners of the rehearing by certified mail, and allowing
them to be represented by legal counsel and to call witnesses on their own behalf,
rectified the earlier court's due process concerns, contending further that these
measures were all the process that was due under the ICRA.43

37. QuairH,2007 WL 1490571, at *3.
38. Id. The court noted that although ICRA's "detention" requirement is no broader than the analogous
provision of "custody" in the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000), see Quair11, 2007 WL
1490571, at *3 n.8, and that the scope of custody in federal habeas corpus jurisprudence has expanded to include
non-physical custody conditions, it found no cases in which a court applied habeas corpus review "where the
purported restraint [did] not limit the petitioner's geographic movement." Id. at *3 (comparing cases that
unsuccessfully attempted to invoke habeas corpus review for fines with cases involving denial of citizenship and
deportation). Apparently, to maintain parallel requirements, the court in Quair11 adopted a comparable geographic
component for ICRA habeas corpus actions.
39. Quair 11, 2007 WL 1490571, at *3; see also id. at *3 n.10 (listing several other membership benefits
forfeited upon disenrollment such as health insurance, housing allotments, and certain employment benefits). Two
of the most powerful rights and privileges of tribal membership not mentioned in the opinion are the right to vote
and the right to serve the tribal community through elected or appointed office. See infra note 41 (discussing the
fact the petitioners only raised the loss of "valuable benefits" and their "tribal identity").
40. Quairl1,2007 WL 1490571, at *3.
41. Id. at *4 ("[Pletitioners have failed to show that disenrollment affects their physical freedom to a degree
that it may be considered tantamount to detention...."). In dismissing the petitioners' disenrollment claims, the court
also noted that the petitioners failed to rebut the Tribe's historical use of disenrollment and banishment. See id. at
*3 n.9. Nor did the petitioners sufficiently establish the consequences of disenrollment beyond the loss of "valuable
benefits" and their "tribal identity." Id. at *4. Professor Angela Riley recently addressed the difficult task of
balancing an individual's rights to fairness with a tribe's right to autonomy in the context of banishment and
membership practices, noting that
[i]ndividuals who are illegitimately denied entry (or are subject to forced exit) may suffer great
losses in terms of community and cultural identity. This might constitute a poignant loss for
Indians, who are unlikely to be able to access a community outside the tribe where they will be
able to speak their language, participate in religious ceremonies, commune with sacred sites, or
engage with other Indians of the same (or similar) tribal affiliation.
Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1049, 1074 (2007) (footnote omitted). Professor
Riley further urges tribes to "be particularly cautious about capriciously imposing exile." Id.
42. Quair v. Sisco (Quairl), 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 978 (E.D. Cal. 2004); QuairH,2007 WL 1490571, at *4.
43. QuairI, 2007 WL 1490571, at *4.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

Despite these additional measures, the court refused to dismiss the banishment
claim.' Although the Tribe's 2004 rehearing addressed the specific concerns
identified in QuairI regarding notice and witnesses, the court in QuairII indicated
that these were not the sum total of all of the ICRA rights and that broader concepts
of due process needed to be further examined, for example, the right to a fair trial.45
Without delineating the scope of these rights or the scope of the court's review, the
court left a host of issues to be resolved. These issues include what type of hearing
is required for banishment proceedings-a criminal trial or civil hearing; what, if
any, additional due process protections the petitioners are entitled to; whether the
Tribe's 2004 rehearing violated the ICRA in any other respect; and what remedies
may be ordered by the court.'
Lastly, the court addressed the petitioners' claim that the Tribe's banishment
decisions were a per se violation of the ICRA, negating any further inquiry into or
balancing of the parties' respective interests.47 The petitioners essentially argued that
the Tribe's system of government constituted a violation of due process since its
General Council exercised all the governing authority of the Tribe and no
independent tribunal existed to provide a fair and impartial trial.48 They further
alleged that the customary practices of the Tribe were
unwritten, thereby denying
' 4
them "fair warning of proscribed criminal conduct. 1
The court rejected these arguments on several grounds. First, the petitioners had
premised their no balancing argument on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Means v.
Navajo Nation,5 ° which petitioners claimed had overruled Randallv. Yakima Nation
Tribal Court5' and had established a new rule that the due process "protections in
ICRA are identical to those found in the United States Constitution. 52 The district
court summarily rejected this argument, stating, "[R]ather than overruling Randall,
the Means court[] followed Randall, foregoing the balancing test because of the
nature of the Navajo Nation's adjudicatory system. 5' 3 Whereas in Means the Ninth
Circuit dispensed with the balancing test given the Navajo Nation's judicial
system's close resemblance to the Anglo-American system,54 in QuairIH,the Tribe's

44. Id.
45. Id. Characterizing banishment as a criminal proceeding has obvious implications on the standard of
process a tribe's actions will be measured against. A criminal trial requires more extensive procedures, and higher
burdens of proof, than are required in a civil hearing.
46. Id. at *4 n.12. The court's decision raises another significant issue as to the petitioners' relationship to
the Tribe as nonmembers. While their political relationship to the Tribe may have been terminated, they are still
inherently Indian persons.
47. Id. at *4-5.

48. Id. at *5.
49. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005).
51. 841 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1988).
52. Quair II, 2007 WL 1490571, at *5. The petitioners' argument focused on a statement in the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Means where the Means court noted that the defendant had received "'all the criminal
protections [under the ICRA as applied by the Navajo Nation judicial system] that he would receive under the
Federal Constitution."' Id. at *5 n. 15 (quoting Means, 432 F.3d at 935); see also Kunesh, supra note 1, at 139 n.399
and accompanying text (discussing the Means decision, which concerned a habeas corpus challenge to the Navajo

Nation's assertion of criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian).
53. Quair/I, 2007 WL 1490571, at *5 (emphasis added).
54. Id. (explaining that "a balancing of interests was unnecessary [in Means] because of the particular
circumstances in that case, most notably the critically important factor that, unlike the Tribe here... .the Navajo
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"different traditions and customary procedures" necessitated weighing "petitioners'
interests against the interests of the Tribe to determine the scope of petitioners'
rights under ICRA.""
The approach adopted in Quair H follows the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Randall,
which weighs "'the individual right to fair treatment' against 'the magnitude of the
tribal interest"' when the tribal procedures "differ significantly from those
'commonly employed in Anglo-Saxon society. '56 The QuairH court also found the
Randall balancing test applicable because petitioners made "no showing that their
individual interests.. .surpass any countervailing tribal interests. 57 Even so, the
manner in which the Tribe's historical form of government and traditional practices
factor into this interest balancing approach is quite uncertain, especially in light of
the deference to be given to tribal forums and the differences in the protections and
interpretation of the ICRA.51
Although the court in QuairH did not determine the full extent of the protections
guaranteed to individuals under the ICRA, it made several significant new
determinations and refined the original Poodry test for federal habeas corpus review
under the ICRA. First, tribal banishment decisions are criminal proceedings for
purposes of federal habeas jurisdiction under the ICRA. Second, a federal court will
consider tribal disenrollment and banishment decisions as separate and distinct
sanctions when the tribe has independently deliberated each matter. Third, each
tribal decision will be subject to the Poodry test, as expanded in QuairI (criminal
proceeding, detention, and exhaustion of tribal remedies). Fourth, although
cautiously prescribed, a tribal disenrollment decision will warrant habeas corpus
review if it meets all three prongs of the Quair I test and the tribal member has
proven that the disenrollment decision affects the member's physical freedom to a
degree tantamount to detention. Finally, a court will apply the Randallbalancing test
when a tribe follows a model of adjudication substantially different from the AngloAmerican judicial system, meaning that whenever a tribe makes a decision based on
tribal customary or traditional law, its interest in maintaining its cultural identity and
the traditional values of the tribal community will likely be weighed against the
individual tribal member's interest in certain-but not yet fully definedprocedural, and perhaps substantive, protections in the tribe's decision-making
process.
These developments raise serious implications to due process challenges of tribal
actions, most significantly that federal courts will continue to closely examine the
process and procedural context of those decisions. The comity construct proposed
Nation guarantees criminal defendants the right to a jury trial and the right to counsel").
55. Id.
56.

Id. (quoting Randall, 841 F.2d at 900 (citations omitted in original)); see also Kunesh, supra note 1, Part

V.B.
57. QuairII, 2007 WL 1490571, at *5.
58. Id. at *2 ("ICRA guarantees to individual tribe members certain rights that are similar but not identical
to those in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment." (citing Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca
Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 881-82 (2d Cir. 1996))). Further, the Quair II court stated, "In passing ICRA, Congress sought
to achieve a delicate balance between protecting the rights of individual members and respecting tribal sovereignty."
Id. (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978)); see also Kunesh, supra note 1, at 134-35,
138-39 (discussing the responsibility of tribes to adjudicate internal tribal matters and the recognition of tribal
forums to adjudicate such matters under Santa Clara).
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in Banishmentas CulturalJustice remains a conceptually useful framework for the
review and resolution of such multifaceted tribal disputes, as well as for tribes to
assess their own practices. This construct recognizes the cultural value of traditional
tribal systems as well as the value of their customary commitment to "fair and
honest" dealings. 9 Within these systems, "[a] tribe is neither required nor expected
to use the same judicial procedure employed by federal courts."' However, while
"due process dictates no single model of procedural fairness, let alone a particular
form of procedure," 6t when a tribe undertakes the most serious and consequential
consideration of banishment and disenrollment, it must ensure that its tribal laws and
practices espouse time-honored respect for fairness and individual dignity.

59. Bloomberg v. Dreamer, Civ. Appeal No. 90-348, at 5 (Oglala Sioux Nation Sup. Ct. Nov. 29, 1990);
see Kunesh, supra note 1, at 139.
60. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 491 F.3d 878, 891 (8th Cir. 2007).
61. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

